For low efficient of key management, most cloud centers lack fine-grained attribute revocation, which only support revocation of the keys. This paper proposes a novel access policy which supporting fine-grained attributes revocation based on CP-ABE. In this paper, we firstly redesign the key manage policy. The generation and distribubition of the user's private keys are completed by the collaboration of the data owner and attribute authority and it has reduced the cost of the key management. Secondly we embed a random parameter ED x when publish the master key. Through the embeddoor, this scheme can control the access authority of users for who have lost the authority to acess the cloud data. Then, we can gurantee the security of keys based on the designed mechanism of binary tree. Our approach can achieve high performance and can also deal with fine-grained attribute revocation. Finally, the security of this policy has been proved under the standard model.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is derived and developed from the cloud computing as a storage technique. It has been widely used in storage areas because of low cost, simple interface and highly scalable. At the same time, security of cloud storage has been questioned while it's useful and convenient. According to a survey, nearly 70% of users are not willing to store their data in the cloud service provider [1] . More seriously, some well-known cloud service providers such as Google Docs and Linkup have been reported to suffer severe data leak scandals [2] . Obviously, how to enhance the security of the cloud storage has become a hot issue and a challenging in the community.
Access control is an effective method to achieve security and privacy of the user's data. As many cloud storage service provider provide only simple access control funcions, they can only guarantee the securiy of the user's data with tradtional encryption methods. While for the security of the data under the complex and changeable cloud enviroment, these providers often fail to achieve fine-grained acess control. To settle this problem, a new attribute-based encryption scheme is proposed by the reseachers. Sahai and Waters introduce a new method that utilizes an attributebased encryption access control based on identity-based encryption [3, 4] . Then, Bethencourt and other researchers propose a new scheme called KPABE(key policy attributebased encryption) based on ABE, but it cannot support NOT gate, and the attribute revocation is also not included [5] . The problem to design a flexible acess control scheme that can deal with both the NAND gate and the NOT gate has not been solved until Liang and Goyal propose a novel tree structure to eliminate the boundary condition [6, 7] .
It is not a trival problem to design an excellent attribute revocation scheme for ABE. There are mainly three aspects need to be considered:
 ABE itself is a complex mechanism. Firstly, the ciphertext and the user keys are associated with a set of attributes. Secondly, although the access control policy about the ciphertext is decided by the data owners, the attribute keys are managed by the non-trusted attribute authorization.  They are many-to-many relationships between the user groups and the attribute sets. The user groups are revoked along with the attribute revocation, vice versa. The attributes are revoked along with the revocation of the user groups. 
The revocation is complex. It includes user group revocation, user attribute revocation and system attribute revocation. Pirretti is the first one to introduce the key revocation scheme for ABE [8] , but the users have to keep close contact with the authorization center in order to obtain the key. Bethencourt et al [5] try to improve the performance of the key expire so as to reduce the traffic load of communication, but the shortage is that the attribute revocation cannot be done directly when it reaches the deadline. Then Yu et al introduce a semi-trusted proxy scheme based on proxy reencryption technology, the application is limited as the service provider must be stay online [9] .
In this paper a new CP-ABE scheme with embeddoor is proposed. Attribute authority is responsible for the generation and distribution of the user's secret key, while data owner is in charge of the generation and distribution of the data owner's secret key. The benefit of this approach is that it supports the access of data for both the users and the data owners. Besides, it can also reduce the computing cost and the cloud storage cost under the cloud environment. Meanwhile, we control user's access authority using the embeddoor by embedding a parameter to the MK. With the use of the embeddoor, we do not need to update the remained user's secret key during the attribute revocation, and it reduces the cost of re-encryption and achieves high performance for attribute revocation.
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The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we introduce the pre-knowledge. In section 3 we define our system model and security model. In section 4 we define the binary tree mechanism and give our scheme. Then we analyze the security in section 5. Finally we give a conclusion in section 6.
II. PRE-KNOWLEDGE

A. Bilinear Maps
The bilinear maps are widely used in attribute-based encryption systems as it can make the cryptography scheme simple and efficient [10] .
Definition 1: Let G 0 and G 1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, g be a generator of G 0 and e be a bilinear map, e: 
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL
A. System Model
As shown in Fig.1 , the system model presented in this paper consists of 4 parts: Data owner(DO), the trusted third party Attribute Authority ( AA ) , Cloud Storage Server (CSS) and users, referring to [12] . The system model is described as follows: DO is responsible for the generation and distribution of secret keys. AA is fully trusted and in charge of system initialization and generation and distribution of users' secret keys. Furthermore, AA is responsible for attribute revocation when users lost the authority to access the cloud data. CSS is responsible for storing the cloud data which is provided by DO and providing service for cloud access user.
When a new user joins the cloud storage system, AA generates the secret keys based on attribute sets of users. When users access their interested data, they update secret keys by using the master keys generated by DO. User can correctly decrypt the ciphertext only when attribute set related secret key satisfy the attribute policy. In our scheme, DO CSS and AA should stay online all the time, but the user doesn't have to stay online.
B. Security Model
The security of CP-ABE algorithm used in this paper is proved in the selective security model. In this paper, AA is fully trusted. We consider the honest but curious cloud service providers may try to obtain some valuable data files or the unauthorized users to steal the beneficial data through the data that is already in hand. Maybe there are collusion attacks of the two. Here we suppose the communication channels between data owners or users or cloud storage service providers and attributes authority presume to be security, and the DO, AA and CSS will not reveal the user's private keys nor utilize its privilege to decrypt the ciphertext. 
IV. ABE-WE FRAMEWORK
A. Design binary tree structure mechanism Definition 4: complete binary tree is a structure tree which is composed of the token and random key. Each leaf node of binary tree contains a random key and each edge connect node corresponds to a token. Furthermore, each leaf node and the corresponding user is one-to -one mapping.
Let  denotes the XOR gate and () H  represents a public one-way hash function. The length of random key is decided by () H  . The binary tree is built with the following steps:
 The system generates a binary tree based on the total users;  Randomly distribute a key (RK i ) to each node (n i ).  As for the setting of the internal nodes, we adopt the bottom to top method. For the internal node we search the RK i which belongs to the left child node, then the random key for the internal node n j is generated by the hash function RK j =H (RK i );  As for the setting of token, let Flag=1 denote the hash function. If the edge is the connection between the parent node and the left child node, we set the token ij TK Flag  
.While for the right child node, let RK i denote its random key and RK j denotes its parent key. The token whose corrsponding edge is the connection between the parent node and the right child node is set to be TK i-j =H (RK i )  RK j . Definition 6: Let KCS denote Key Chain Set, n i be a random node from binary tree, then KCS i ( 1 im  ) represents the set that contains all the random keys from the leaf node n i to the root node. As depicted from fig.2 , if the node is n 1 , then KCS 1 = { RK 1 ,RK 9 ,RK 11 ,RK 15 }. Definition 7: Let TCS denote Token Chain Set, let n i be a random leaf node, then TCS i represents the set that contains all the tokens from the leaf node n i to the root node. As depicted from fig.2 , if the leaf node is n 2 ,then TCS 2 ={TK 2-11 、Flag、Flag}. The publication of the EDkey: As mentioned the relationship between leaf node and user is one-toone mapping based on the mechanism of binary tree, and the corresponding random secret key is EDkey. Proof: Randomly select a leaf node n i , if n i is a left child node, then the random secret key for the parent node n j can be obtained by RK j =H (RK i ), and we can obtain the KCS; if n i is a right child node, then the random secret key for the parent node n j can be obtained by RK j =H (RK i )  TK i-j = H (RK i )  H (RK i )  RK i . Hypothesis 2: If the random secret key for a random leaf node is provided, even someone obtain all the tokens for a binary tree, he cannot recover the random secret key for all nodes other than the random secret key from the leaf node to the root node.
Proof: Let i n be a random leaf node, we can obtain the secret key from i n to root node based on the Hypothesis 1.
Then, let j n be a parent node and i n to be a left child node, n is be the right child node, we cannot recover the secret key neither. The security of this scheme is depended on both the security of the cpabe-we encryption algorithm and the security of the attribute avocation scheme. The cpabe algorithm is proposed based on the PBDHE math problem, which is proved to be security under the standard model. cpabe-we algorithm is the inheritance and extension of cpabe algorithm from the following two aspects:  Changing the generation of secret key, the ciphertext can be decrypted when user obtained the OSK which distributed by DO; 
The attribute embeddoor EDx is employed for each attribute x. Through the control of EDx, we can achieve fine-grained attribute revocation. EDx is encrypted by the random secret key and the binary tree mechanism is proved to be security from the Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Thus the cpabe-we is also security under the standard model. AA will randomly select the embeddoor when the attribute is revoked. Meanwhile, the revoked user neither can obtain the random key nor access the cloud data because of the new embeddoor. We can make a conclusion that capbewe is security.
VI. CONCLUSION
How to guarantee the security of data under the cloud environment becomes a hot topic for recent years. This paper designs the cpabe with embeddoor encryption algorithm and the binary tree mechanism based on the existed cpabe. Take advantage of the design for embeddoor, it is unnecessary to update the non-revocatory user's secret key when dealing with the attribute revocation. Thus this scheme can effectively reduce the cost of re-encryption. Besides, the mechanism of binary tree can recover the random key from the leaf node to the root node through the tokens when user obtain the random key of leaf node, and it can also reduce the storage cost of random key. Our approach not only supports the data user from DO access the cloud data but also reduce the cost of computation and storage.
